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This paper seeks to understand whether Mauritanian 
firms deem corruption as an obstacle to operate and 
grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more 
likely to make informal payments, and to quantify 
the size of these payments. The results of the analysis 
show that perceptions of corruption can be potentially 
misleading. Corruption is not considered to be one of 
the most taxing factors impeding the growth of firms 
in Mauritania. Yet, its cost to firms is significant and 
greater than in the comparator group countries. This 
means that corruption is internalized by firms and 
considered an accepted practice. Alternatively, firms may 
This paper—a product of the Africa Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (AFTP4). Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mfrancisco@
worldbank.org and npontara@worldbank.org. 
fear reporting corruption practices for fear of retaliation. 
Econometric evidence on the propensity and intensity 
of bribes suggests that medium-size firms suffer the 
most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger firms are 
more established and connected, do not fear exiting the 
market, and are less likely to be harassed. Smaller firms 
are less visible and may be able to escape the control of 
public officials by operating largely in the informal sector.   
Medium-size firms are the most likely to pay bribes and 
to pay the highest amounts as a percentage of their total 
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1. Introduction 
Governance is one of the key, cross-cutting building blocks of a healthy investment 
climate and has become the focus of many policy makers in recent years. Weak 
governance implies a breakdown in one or more parts of the structure created by the 
complex relationships between a country’s institutions and traditions. One of the most 
harmful symptoms of such a breakdown is widespread corruption.
1 Fighting corruption 
has therefore become one of the key elements in efforts to promote good governance. 
Over the last decade, several empirical studies have attempted to examine the relationship 
between corruption and various indicators of economic development. Overall, weak 
governance and corruption have been associated with lower levels of development: the 
higher the perception of corruption, the lower per capita GDP (see Figure 1) (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 2000). Studies also show a significant negative correlation between corruption 
and growth rates (Tanzi and Davoodi ibid., Mauro 2005).  
 
There are different channels through which corruption can affect development: one of 
them is public finance. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show that corruption may increase 
public investment, but reduces its quality and productivity. This can lead to the 
deterioration of essential public infrastructure needed for sustained economic growth. 
Other studies (Mauro 1998, Gupta, Davoodi and Alfonso-Terme 1998) focus on the 
overall composition of public spending and find that higher corruption is associated with 
lower spending on education and health. Finally, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-
Lobaton (2000) show that countries with high corruption tend to collect less tax revenues 
(as measured by the tax to GDP ratio). The empirical evidence thus suggests that 





                                                 
1 Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain and personal gain can be 
defined as financial (bribes, kickbacks etc.) or other benefits (gifts, privileges etc.) (Jain 2001).   3
  Figure 1:Corruption Perception and GDP (in PPP US$) 
 

















However, most of these studies establish associations, which do not necessarily imply 
causality one way or the other. Overall, the impact of corruption is difficult to prove 
empirically and some findings are open to debate. One of the reasons is the difficulty of 
measuring corruption. Whether grand, legislative or petty (see Jain 2001), corruption 
tends to take place in secrecy, making it hard to detect or measure. As a result, corruption 
data are often perception based indicators which raise concerns about perception bias. 
The other problem with the results at the aggregate macroeconomic level is the aggregate 
nature of the data that hides important differences on the relationship between corruption 
and individual agents. That is, firms facing the same overcharging legal environment may 
still be affected in different ways because of their idiosyncratic characteristics.  
 
There is relatively little evidence on the determinants of corruption at the firm level in 
developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Svensson (2003), using firm-
level data for Uganda, tries to identify who are the bribe payers and how much they pay. 
He applies a simple bargaining model and finds that the extent of dealings with public 
officials determines the likelihood of having to pay bribes, and that the amount paid is 
influenced by the firm’s ability to pay and power to refuse paying (the firm’s bargaining 
power). Kuncoro (2006) uses firm-level data for Indonesia to estimate bribe intensity 
both in day-to-day operations and in opening a new business. He finds that higher tax   4
payments, more time spent on negotiations, and a heavy regulatory burden go hand in 
hand with larger bribes for day-to-day operations (See Annex 2). 
  
As in Svensson (2003) and Kuncoro (2006) this paper avoids the pitfalls of aggregate 
data. The analysis is based on the 2006 Investment Climate Survey (ICS) – conducted in 
2005 – which contains data on 361 Mauritanian firms, located in Nouakchott and 
Nouadhibou and representing the manufacturing, retail, information technology, and 
other sectors (See Annex 4). The data set includes quantitative information on bribe 
payments.  The paper aims to understand whether Mauritanian firms deem corruption as 
an obstacle to operate and grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more likely to 
make informal payments, and to quantify the size of these payments. To the authors’ 
knowledge, no analysis of corruption at the firm level in Mauritania has been carried out 
to date, hence the paper makes an initial contribution in this area of study. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Mauritanian 
context and explains why it is important to focus on corruption at the firm level. Section 
3 presents the descriptive analysis focusing on the perception of corruption by 
Mauritanian firms, the main characteristics of petty corruption and the financial cost of 
corruption. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework and specification of the 
econometric model used, while Section 5 discusses the results of the econometric 
analysis on bribe propensity (i.e., the probability of paying a bribe) and intensity (i.e., the 
payments of bribes as a share of the firm’s annual sales). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Importance of Reducing Corrupt Practices and Stimulating Competition for 
Private Sector Development  
Mauritania is at a cross-road. With relatively good natural resource prospects (oil, iron 
ore, fisheries, copper and gold), the economy is poised to grow rapidly in the future 
potentially triggering a transition from low to middle-income country.
2 The key 
challenge confronting policy makers today is to diversify the sources of growth besides 
                                                 
2 Mauritania has a population of 2.9 million people and a per capita GDP of US$ 921 (World Bank, 2007). 
The non-oil (oil) GDP growth rate in 2006 was 4.4 percent (11.7 percent with oil).   5
natural resources, and attract investment by creating an enabling environment for private 
sector development. But there are significant barriers to overcome. First of all, the 
country displays already a distorted economy and dependent policy that tends to prioritize 
rent redistribution over wealth creation (Auty and Pontara 2008). Weak governance and 
corruption have become a central concern in Mauritania in recent times, as evidence 
emerged on the existence of significant extra-budgetary spending and embezzlement of 
public resources between the end of the 1980s and 2004. (See Annex 1 on governance 
indicators.)  
 
Secondly, the development of the private sector to date has been mainly constrained by 
lack of competition due, inter alia, to the presence of powerful and well-connected 
business groups. A key feature of the modern sector is the high concentration of 
ownership by a few families of large businesses in trade and commerce. Large private 
trading monopolies thus skim rent from the urban economy at the expense of domestic 
(more competitive) private producers whose margins are shrunk by high factor costs. The 
considerable monopolistic power on the domestic market enjoyed by powerful groups is 
reinforced through formal (e.g. administrative authorizations to enter into some sectors 
such as tourism, transport, etc.) and informal regulatory barriers that tend to make 
markets less contestable. A dynamic informal sector also exits but tax and regulatory 
policies, as well as the dominance of large competitors, restrict the emergence of new 
entrepreneurs (World Bank, 2007). 
 
Monopolies also dominate bank credit and insurance services at the expense of small and 
medium-size businesses, potentially the most dynamic economic agents, who do not have 
preferential access to long-term credit and lack political connections. A further hindrance 
to private sector development is the under-development of financial markets, unreliable 
infrastructure, lack of skilled workers, and scarce industrial entrepreneurial experience. 
Given these market failures it is not surprising that entrepreneurs prefer to invest 
wherever possible in trade rather than production; or that most urban workers support 
themselves through the extended family and petty trade. These factors, combined, have 
restrained the emergence of private sector activity and, notably, the expansion of small   6
and medium enterprises, putting a lead on the growth potential in Mauritania beyond the 
exploitation of natural resources. 
 
Some attention has been paid in the literature to the country’s political economy. What 
emerges is that corrupt practices have deep social roots in Mauritania and reflect decades 
of rent-driven development in the iron ore and fisheries sectors. Under the rule of Ould 
Taya (1984- 2005) power was de facto retained by a military oligarchy that fostered neo-
patrimonialism, i.e. a system where relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a 
formal political and administrative system through a predominant party system (Ould 
Ahmed Salem 2001, Marianne 2001, N’Diaye 2006). The period was also characterized 
by a general “banalization” of corruption and wide-spread embezzlement (Blundo 
2007).
3 Fractiousness within the dominant groups encouraged the leadership to maintain 
power by using state control of productive activity in order to generate resources to 
sustain a clientelistic patronage system. The political power sought and obtained the 
support of the dynamic businessmen elite, while the milieu d’affaires sets out to conquer 
the “state market” (Ould Ahmed Salem 1999).  
                                                
 
With a view to adding a further dimension to this analysis, the remaining part of this 
paper attempts to shed further light on the underdevelopment of Mauritanian private 
sector, and of SMEs in particular, by focusing on the extent of bribe propensity and 
intensity as barriers to growth. The results discussed in this paper could be also important 
input to foster the dialogue with the newly elected Government. Mauritania has the 
chance to make a fresh start, after a successful coup in August 2005 deposed the long-
serving president and led to parliamentary elections in early-2007 and also improvements 
in the technical quality of governance.
4 To succeed, arguably, the new government will 
need to deploy economic reforms that will threaten powerful rent-seeking interests.  
 
3 Increasing income inequality under Taya reflected a process of wealth redistribution towards a clientele 
chosen because of “ethnicity”, “tribalism” or “status” within the system of Mauritanian society. The 
president rewarded tribal leaders for their loyalty with positions in government and key sectors of the 
economy that conferred access to public resources to reward their constituencies. Office holders were 
rotated to spread access to state largesse and to limit incentives to defect to the opposition (Marianne, 2001, 
Ould Ahmed Salem, 2001). 
4 Mauritania’s transition culminated in March 25, 2007 with the second round of the presidential election. 
Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdellahi was elected President. Various initiatives to improve governance and reduce 
corruption are underway (World Bank 2007).   7
3. Descriptive Analysis 
3.1 Firms’ perception of corruption in Mauritania 
In 2005, some 303 of the 361 firms surveyed (84 percent) admitted paying bribes to 
government officials, while only 58 firms (16 percent) in the sample denied it. These 
shares are similar to those found by Svensson (2003) for Ugandan enterprises surveyed in 
1998 (81 percent). Yet, only 18 percent of firms in Mauritania consider corruption as a 
major or severe constraint for their business operations and growth, while 44 percent of 
firms rate access to finance a major/severe constraint. Firms consider tax rates (32 
percent), anti-competitive practices by informal businesses (31 percent), and electricity 
and access to land (26 percent) as major/severe barriers to their growth and operations 
(Figure 2). Breaking down the sample into formal and informal firms, the results show 
that approximately 18 percent of formal firms perceive corruption as a major/severe 
obstacle to growth, while this share is around 12 percent for informal firms. 
 




18 18 18 16 14















Customs and trade reg



























































Source: Mauritania ICS, 2006. 
 
 
The low perception of corruption in Mauritania stands out when comparing it with other 
countries. The share of formal businesses that identifies corruption as a major/severe 
impediment to do business in Mauritania (18 percent) is much lower than in neighboring 
countries such as Mali (49 percent), Senegal (40 percent), or other SSA countries like 
Cameroon (53 percent). It remains nevertheless higher that in middle-income countries 
such as South Africa (16 percent) and most OECD countries. If obstacles to business   8
operations and growth (15 independent questions in the survey) are ranked according to 
the percentage of firms that consider them a major/severe obstacle, corruption comes in 
the 10
th place in Mauritania, but only in 2
nd place, for instance, in Mali (Figure 3).
5 
 
Figure 3: Corruption as major/severe obstacle to growth (% of firms, right axis) and 
overall rank as an obstacle to growth (left axis), formal sector, selected countries 
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  Source: ICS database 
 
3.2 Petty corruption 
Petty corruption in Mauritania is pervasive.
6 Regardless of the firm category, the most 
common payment of bribes by entrepreneurs is made in order to: (a) establish a water 
connection; (b) obtain a construction permit; and (c) establish an electricity connection. 
Relatively fewer firm, by contrast, make informal payment to establish a connection to a 
mainline telephone and obtaining an import or operating license. On average, medium-
size enterprises operating in Nouadhibou are the most taxed by informal payment 
although there are notable exceptions (See Annex 5 for the complete set of data).  
 
The extent of petty corruption associated with the provision of selected public services 
becomes even more startling when compared internationally. In water, the share of bribe-
paying firms (75 percent) in Mauritania is about the double than those of Benin, 
                                                 
5 There are 15 independent questions on 15 distinct obstacles to growth in the ICS.  
6 This analysis is based on reported answers of whether bribes were paid in order to speed up the delivery 
of day-to-day services.    9
Cameroon, Mali and Niger. Some 42 percent of firms in Mauritania paid to obtain a 
connection to the electricity grid, a share more than double that of Niger (19.2 percent), 
and higher than in Benin, Cameroon and Mali. In addition, almost 53 percent of firms in 
Mauritania were expected to pay bribes to providers of construction permits, once more 
setting the record in the comparator group. Most of these payments are made to 
accelerate the speed of connections, as well as their quality, and to reduce the 
bureaucratic procedures to obtain construction permits. To the extent that inefficiency 
and red tape assures a bribe payment, there is little incentive to remove them, with 
adverse consequences on the growth and dynamism of Mauritanian firms (Figure 4).
7 
 
Figure 4: Informal payments requested (% firms), selected countries 
(a) To obtain mainline telephone and electricity 
connection 
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Water connection Construction permit  
Notes: **Proportion statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 5% level. ***Proportion statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 1% level. Formal sector only. 
Source: ICS database. 
                                                 
7 The number of connections to the water system is low and leads to high water cost and charges, which are 
the highest in the sub-region. Water access for industrial use remains problematic. SONELEC, the National 
Electricity Company, offers an intermittent service: amongst manufacturing firms power outages cause an 
average loss of approximately 3.3 percent of annual sales.   10
3.3 The financial cost of corruption  
On average, Mauritanian firms 
make informal payments to “get 
things done” of about 4.8 percent 
of the annual sales and of 7.7 
percent of the contract value to 
secure contracts with the 
government. Survey results show 
bribes in percentage of the sales 
increase with size up to a point 
and then decrease. Medium 
companies are the ones that pay 
a larger percentage of their sales (7.8 percent).
8 To secure government contracts, medium 
and large firms report to pay, on average, 7.8 and 7.0 percent of the contract value, 
respectively, while micro and small firms pay on average 4.5 and 6.2 percent (See Figure 
5). Furthermore, the payment of bribes as a percentage of sales are, on average, larger for 
firms with foreign capital, and with accounts audited externally (see Annex 6).  
Figure 5: Average bribes to “get things done” (% 

















Payments to "get things done" Payments to secure gov contracts  
Source: Mauritania ICS, 2006 
 
The average payment of firms in 
Mauritania to “get things done” (as a 
percentage of total sales, 4.8 percent) is 
higher than in neighboring countries such 
as Senegal (1.7 percent) and Mali (3.4 
percent), but around half the value for 
Niger (9.6 percent) and lower than 
Cameroon and Benin. Informal payments 
to secure contracts with the government 
(as a share of the value of the contract) 
are higher in Mauritania (7.7 percent) 
Figure 6: Bribes to “get things done” (% 
of sales) and to secure public contracts 






















Payments to secure gov contracts
Payments to "get things done"
 
Note: *Means statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 10% level. **Means 
statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 5% level. ***Means statistically different 
from Mauritania’s at the 1% level. 
Source: Mauritania ICS, 2006.
                                                 
8 The size categories are (number of employees): micro (1-5); small (6-10); medium (11-20), and large 
(more than 21). Employment is a variable with a left-skewed distribution, which makes it difficult to create 
an even distribution for the four size categories.    11
than in the whole comparator sample with the exception of Benin and Niger (8.8 percent 
and 12.7 percent respectively) (See Figure 6). These results suggest that while the 
perception of corruption in Mauritania is low, its costs are relatively high, suggesting that 
paying bribes is a practice that has been internalized by firms and commonly accepted. 
Alternatively, this discrepancy could mean that firms do not report accurately corruption 
practices for fear of retaliation. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis: The Theoretical Framework and Specification 
4.1 Bribe propensity 
Firms typically have to pay bribes when dealing with public officials whose actions (and 
power) directly affect firms’ business operations and profitability. Examples include 
demands for basic infrastructure services, construction or import/export licenses. Firms 
with extensive dealings with public officials are more likely to be under bureaucratic 
control and therefore more exposed to bribe harassment (Svensson, 2003). Therefore, the 
probability that a firm may have to pay a bribe can be stated as: 
 
                            pi = χ wi + ui       ( 1 )  
 
where pi is the probability that firm i will have to pay bribes, wi is a vector measuring the 
required dealing and thus exposure to the public sector, χ is a vector coefficient, and ui is 
an unobserved error term. Since the probability of a firm i to pay bribes (pi) is not directly 
observed, the propensity equation is revised as a probit model: 
 
                          Pr(pi = 1) = Φ (χw wi + χz zi)     (2) 
 
where pi = 1 [pi = 0] is the event that a firm (does not) faces a bureaucrat and must pay 
bribes. Φ is the standard normal distribution function. As proxies for firms’ dealings with 
public officials, we consider the number of fiscal inspections, and an infrastructure index, 
the latter following Svensson (2003). In addition, the probability of facing a bureaucrat is 
also explained by sector, regional and firm related variables. Firm-related variables   12
follow the descriptive analysis above as suggested by Kuncoro (2006). (See Annex 3 for 
the complete set of variables). 
 
4.2 Bribe intensity 
If all firms face the same set of rules and regulations, then the amount to be paid in bribes 
depends on the bargaining power of the firm. Therefore, firm-specific characteristics 
would influence the magnitude of the bribe demanded by public officials. For instance, 
firms with high profits today or higher profits expected tomorrow have a weaker 
bargaining position, which forces them to pay higher bribes. The bargaining hypothesis 
suggests that the amount of bribes a firm is requested to pay depends on the bureaucrats’ 
perception of the firm’s ability to pay, which varies from firm to firm as the bureaucrat 
discriminates bribes. We assume as variables capturing the bargaining power: size in 
terms of employment (Kuncoro, 2006, uses size measured in sales) and investments as a 
share of total sales (i.e., an alternative for the firm’s expected future profits or its ability 
to pay, as in Svensson, 2003). Therefore, the bargaining hypothesis can be stated as:
9 
 
           bi = β0 + β1Ei
2 + β2Ei + β3IS + β4 zi+ ei     (3) 
 
where bi are the bribes paid as a share of the annual total sales of firm i, E is size in terms 
of employment, IS are the investments as a share of total sales, ei is an error term. β0, β1, 
β2 and β3 are coefficients. The descriptive analysis suggests that the relation between the 
bribe-intensity and size is non linear. To capture the non-linearity we add employment 
squared to the equation and we expect that β1< 0. Let the vector characterizing the 
bargaining position to be denoted by v = (Ei, IS). zi is the vector of the remaining firm-
related variables that may explain bribe intensity. The magnitude of the bribe payment as 
a share of the firm’s annual sales (2) is estimated by ordinary least-squares (OLS). (See 
Annex 3 for the complete set of variables.) 
 
                                                 
9 This non-linear assumption is based on the descriptive statistics firm size considering bribes as a share of 
total sales, for which a smooth inverted U-shape was found.   13
Both equations (2) and (3) were estimated using continuous and discrete (i.e., micro, 
small, medium, and large) variables for employment, because the cut-off rule for firm 
size is debatable. Furthermore, the two processes (propensity and intensity) are 
independent as suggested by the Heckman selection model for specifications (2) and (3) 
which shows that the two error terms are not correlated. The null-hypothesis that the 
correlation term (ρ) equals zero cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level (using firm size 
in terms of employment: Prob>χ
2=0.5524; using firm size categories: Prob>χ
2=0.4355). 
Therefore, the two “decisions” made by the firm (i.e., bribe propensity, and bribe 
intensity) are independent, justifying the use of a probit model to estimate bribe 
propensity and an OLS model to estimate bribe intensity. 
 
5. Results  
5.1 Bribe propensity  
Table 1 reports a series of six probit regressions, according to equation (2), which 
estimate the probability of a firm to pay bribes to public officials in Mauritania (bribe 
propensity). All regressions control for sector and region
10,11. Results are robust and 
stable, and support the hypothesis on which the development of the model was based. A 
non-linear relationship between bribes and firm size is found. Bribe rates increase with 
firm size, but then decrease. The employment variable is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level and employment squared is negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. This result is corroborated when using discrete variables for size.
12 Only 
medium-size firms have a significantly higher probability of paying bribes to government 
officials than micro enterprises (omitted dummy). A possible interpretation for this 
results is that medium firms while visible and exposed do not have the bargaining power 
of the large companies and may fear to leave the market.  
 
                                                 
10 Control for formality is captured by the size discrete variable. All informal firms are micro firms. 
11 Svensson (2003) found that the probability of a firm paying bribes increases between 14 and 20 percent if 
it is a formal enterprise (vs. an informal enterprise). 
12 Specifications (2), (4), and (6), Table 1. 
   14
Companies with foreign ownership are more prone to pay bribes to government officials. 
Firms with some degree of foreign ownership are about 10 percent more likely to make 
informal payments to government officials than purely domestically-owned firms, ceteris 
paribus. For Smarzynska and Wei (2000), corruption makes local bureaucracy less 
transparent and increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic 
maze. Furthermore, as pointed out by Kuncoro (2006), foreign ownership may make a 
firm more vulnerable to bureaucratic predation, and for this reason foreign firms typically 
have domestic partners – for their ability to ward off such predation. Moreover, the 
likelihood of a firm paying bribes in Mauritania decreases as the average monthly wage 
per worker increases. It is expected that firms that pay higher wages would hire more 
formal workers (and more skilled labor). As this can be interpreted as a measure of 
formality and legal compliance (labor rules), one should expect these firms to be less 
vulnerable to be harassed by officials.  
 
The higher the percentage of senior management time spent dealing with government 
regulations each week (i.e., tax time), the lower the probability of a firm to pay bribes in 
Mauritania. A 10 percent increase in the tax time would be associated with a 3 percent 
decrease in this probability, everything else held constant. This result suggests that 
companies that comply with procedures are less vulnerable to bribe predation. Another 
possible interpretation is that more time spent dealing with government regulations may 
be reflected in having closer ties with officials and thus being less likely to be asked to 
pay bribes. Nevertheless, Svensson (2002) found that senior management in firms 
reporting that they had to pay bribes spend significantly more time dealing with 




As the number of dealings between firms and tax officials increases, so does the firm’s 
probability of paying bribes. Results show that one additional tax inspection (in a year) is 
associated with an increase of 16 to 17 percent in the probability of paying a bribe. In 
addition, firms that rate corruption as a major or severe obstacle to their growth and 
                                                 
13 A similar result was found by Gaviria (2000), who used perception-based data at the firm-level in 20 
Latin American countries.   15
                                                
operations are around 12 percent more likely to pay bribes than firms that rate this 
obstacle differently.
14 Furthermore, the firm’s location is a determinant of bribe 
propensity in Mauritania, while sector is not. Firms located in Nouadhibou are around 10 
percent more likely to pay bribes to public officials than firms operating in Nouakchott.  
 
14 Corruption can be considered an endogenous variable to the model and, therefore, this is only included in 
two of the specifications.  
 Table 1: Probit estimations on the incidence of corruption among Mauritanian firms – 
the probability of a firm paying bribes  
Independent variable  Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment  0.004* --  0.004* --  0.003* -- 
  (1.60)   (1.56)   (1.52)  
Employment  squared  -0.00002** --  -0.00002** --  -0.00002** -- 
  (2.11)   (2.03)   (1.96)  
Age  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.0001  0.001 
  (0.24) (0.28) (0.48) (0.67) (0.04) (0.29) 
Economic group  0.0222  0.002 0.018 0.0004  0.00002  -0.007 
  (0.32) (0.03) (0.26) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) 
Foreign 0.103*  0.101*  0.102* 0.095* 0.094* 0.09* 
  (1.67) (1.78) (1.65) (1.70) (1.68) (1.84) 
Loan  0.118** 0.087*  0.114** 0.078  0.100*  0.067 
  (1.91) (1.67) (1.89) (1.43) (1.74) (1.28) 
Monthly wage per worker  -2.06E-06**  -2.07E-06*** -2.09E-06*** -2.06E-06*** -2.25E-06*** -1.98E-06*** 
  (2.34) (2.42) (2.40) (2.44) (2.76) (2.57) 
Tax-time -0.003**  -0.002*  -0.003** -0.003*  -0.003***  -0.003** 
  (2.12) (1.71) (2.27) (1.90) (2.27) (1.96) 
Corruption  -- -- -- -- 0.134***  0.119*** 
      (2.70)  (2.67) 
Fiscal  inspections  --  --  0.159*** 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.168*** 
      (2.39) (2.54) (2.43) (2.64) 
Infrastructure  index  -- -- 0.042  0.05**  0.030  0.039 
      (1.56) (1.96) (1.18) (1.62) 
Small  -- -0.006  -- -0.02  -- -0.014 
   (0.14)   (0.48)   (0.36) 
Medium  -- 0.154***  -- 0.149***  -- 0.132*** 
   (2.79)   (2.79)   (2.69) 
Large  -- 0.026  -- 0.014  -- -0.004 
   (0.36)   (0.20)   (0.05) 
Retail and IT  0.0004  0.004  -0.013 -0.014 -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.01) (0.07) (0.23) (0.26) (0.04) (0.13) 
Other services  -0.086  -0.089 -0.088 -0.093*  -0.071 -0.081 
  (1.52) (1.58) (1.55) (1.69) (1.32) (1.56) 
Nouadhibou 0.110*  0.098*  0.105* 0.09*  0.098* 0.083* 
  (1.92) (1.79) (1.85) (1.68) (1.83) (1.64) 
No.  observations  359 359 359 359 358 358 
LR χ
2  30.31 37.07 37.54 46.25 47.39 55.45 
Pseudo R
2  0.095 0.117 0.118 0.146 0.149 0.175 
Note: *Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
Micro is the omitted category for size. Manufacturing is the omitted category for sector. Nouakchott is the omitted category for region. 
 5.2 Bribe intensity  
Table 2 reports a series of six OLS regressions, according to equation (3), which 
estimates the payment of bribes as a share of the firm’s annual sales (bribe intensity). All 
regressions control for sector and region. Results are robust and stable and support the 
hypothesis developed above. The bargaining hypothesis suggests that bribery payments 
as a share of total sales depend on the firm size. An inverted U-shape relationship 
between size and bribe intensity was also found and, corroborating with the descriptive 
statistics illustrated in Figure 4, medium-size firms are the ones that suffer most from 
corruption in Mauritania. Since harassment takes up public officials’ time, they may 
focus on large firms in order to receive higher returns for their (time) investments. 
However, it might be true that officials may be content to accept lower bribe rates (as 
shares of the firms’ annual sales) from large firms, given that these will translate into 
higher absolute amounts. Public officials may also be reluctant to try to extract bribes 
from large firms given their networks with higher ranking local or national officials.  
 
This is confirmed when the estimations use firm discrete categories for size. Only 
medium-size enterprises present significantly higher bribe intensity than micro 
enterprises. Kuncoro (2006) found a similar result for Indonesian firms using data for 
2001: the coefficients of the three firm size dummies used in his OLS estimations 
suggested some degree of non-linearity in the bribe intensity function.
15,16 In addition, 
the bargaining hypothesis also suggests bribe intensity to be dependent on the firm’s 
investments as a share of total sales. Indeed, a 1 percent increase in investments as a 
share of total sales is associated with a 0.3–0.5 percent increase in bribe intensity, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
                                                 
15 Kuncoro (2006) also created four size categories in terms of annual sales (i.e., small, smaller medium, 
larger medium, and large). In his specifications for bribe intensity, “small” (annual sales lower than Rp 1 
billion) was the omitted category and the firm size (negative) coefficients that statistically differed from the 
omitted category were “larger medium” (annual sales between Rp 5 billion and Rp 10 billion) and “large” 
(annual sales greater than Rp 10 billion). 
16 Svensson (2003), analyzing corruption among Ugandan enterprises, developed five OLS corruption 
regressions having graft in absolute terms (US$) as the dependent variable and he found firm size in terms 
of employment to be one of its determinants. Everything else held constant, one additional worker would 
be associated with an increase in bribes paid to government officials between of US$10.2 and US$16.4.   18
Bribe payments as a share of a firm’s annual sales are lower the older the firm. One-year 
increase in age is associated with a decrease of 0.04 to 0.06 percent in bribe intensity. 
This may reflect the fact that older firms are more likely to have mastered the workings 
of the country’s bureaucratic system. On the contrary, firms with external auditing and/or 
access to credit have to pay a larger percentage of their sales in bribes. Firms that have 
their statements and certificates audited by an external party pay around 2.0 percent more 
bribes as a share of their total sales than those that do not, everything else constant. In 
addition, firms with credit access pay between 2.03 and 2.7 percent more bribes as a 
share of their annual sales than firms without loans, ceteris paribus.  
 
The higher the number of tax inspections in a given year, the higher the bribe intensity. 
On average, an additional fiscal inspection increases the share of annual sales paid in 
bribes by about 1.1 percent. The more exposed firms are to bribe requests (i.e., the more 
visits by tax inspectors), the higher the probability of the firm paying bribes and, as a 
result, the higher the bribe intensity. In addition, the infrastructure index is a determinant 
of bribe intensity: if a firm requests the connection of a telephone mainline or electricity, 
the amount of bribes it pays as a share of its total sales increases by 0.60-0.85 percent, 
ceteris paribus. Proxying the regulatory burden on Indonesian firms by the number of 
operational licenses required for normal business operations, Kuncoro (2006) found it to 
be a determinant of bribe intensity in his 2001 sample – one additional license would be 
associated with an increase in bribe intensity between 0.13 and 0.16 percent.  
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Table 2: OLS corruption regressions, bribes as a share of total sales is the dependent variable in percentage 
Independent variable  Specification 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.654***  2.847***  1.217 1.468*  1.057  1.286* 
  (4.14) (4.02)  (1.52)  (1.84) (1.48) (1.76) 
Employment 0.072** --  0.07***  --  0.072** -- 
 (2.46)    (2.41)    (2.51)   
Employment squared  -0.0003***  --  -0.0003***  --  -0.0003***  -- 
 (3.29)    (23.17)    (3.25)   
Age -0.064**  -0.057*  -0.046  -0.035  -0.057*  -0.044 
  (1.98) (1.73)  (1.41)  (1.08) (1.92) (1.47) 
Audit 2.196***  2.19***  1.97**  1.947**  1.786**  1.814** 
  (2.51) (2.51)  (2.30)  (2.30) (2.19) (2.25) 
Economic group  -0.945  -0.972  -0.970 -1.021  -1.115  -1.100 
  (0.96) (0.89)  (1.02)  (0.99) (1.15) (1.07) 
Investments over sales  0.0003*** 0.0003***  0.0005***  0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
  (4.82) (4.33)  (5.25)  (4.92) (5.74) (5.37) 
Loan  2.645*** 2.505***  2.628***  2.466*** 2.172*** 2.032*** 
  (4.23) (3.89)  (4.16)  (3.82) (3.55) (3.23) 
Tax-time -0.019  -0.016  -0.024 -0.020  -0.024  -0.022 
  (1.26) (1.06)  (1.37)  (1.29) (1.57) (1.51) 
Corruption  -- --  --  -- 2.214***  2.239*** 
        (3.54)  (3.41) 
Fiscal inspections  --  --  1.156*  1.089*  1.220**  1.143** 
     (1.95)  (1.74)  (2.30)  (2.04) 
Infrastructure index  --  --  0.74***  0.849***  0.595**  0.701*** 
     (2.64)  (3.04)  (2.11)  (2.52) 
Small --  0.108  --  -0.055  --  0.003 
   (0.23)    (0.12)    (0.01) 
Medium --  1.329*  --  1.369**  --  1.464** 
   (1.87)    (2.01)    (2.12) 
Large --  1.217  --  1.109  --  1.040 
   (1.10)    (1.06)    (1.06) 
Retail and IT  -0.004  -0.006 -0.171  -0.209  -0.127  -0.159 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.30)  (0.34) (0.25) (0.28) 
Other services  0.092  0.084 0.117  0.094  0.155  0.109 
  (0.15) (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.16) (0.29) (0.20) 
Nouadhibou 0.857  0.820 0.698 0.639  0.692  0.634 
  (1.52) (1.44)  (1.23)  (1.12) (1.25) (1.14) 
No.  observations  266 266  266  266 266 266 
R
2  0.187 0.166  0.219  0.204 0.268 0.254 
Note: *Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. 
Micro is the omitted category for size. Manufacturing is the omitted category for sector. Nouakchott is the omitted category for region.  20
6. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to make an initial contribution to the analysis of the 
determinants of corruption at the firm level in Mauritania, using both descriptive and 
econometric analysis, on the basis of the ICS data for 2005. The paper builds on the work 
conducted in Uganda by Svensson (2003) and in Indonesia by Kuncoro (2006). The 
overarching aims of the present work were to understand whether Mauritanian firms 
deem corruption as an obstacle to operate and grow; identify the profile of firms that are 
more likely to make informal payments; and quantify the size of these payments. The 
analysis conducted in this paper has yielded the following key results: 
 
•  Perceptions of corruption can be potentially misleading. As illustrated above, in the 
case of Mauritania, data on the perception of corruption at the firm level show that: 
(i) corruption is not considered to be one the most taxing factor impeding firms’ 
growth in Mauritania, and: (ii) the perception of corruption as an obstacle to growth 
is significantly lower that in neighboring countries. However, the cost of corruption 
to firms is significant – both when expressed in percentage of firms’ annual sales or 
contract value – and higher than in the comparator group’s countries. By 
broadening the analysis beyond perception, it is apparent that corruption is 
internalized by firms and considered common, accepted practice in Mauritania. 
•  Econometric evidence on bribe propensity and intensity suggest that medium-size 
firms are the ones that suffer most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger firms are 
more established and connected, do not fear exiting the market and less likely to be 
harassed.  Smaller firms are less visible and may be able to escape the control of 
public official, by operating largely in the informal sector. The results add value to 
the hypothesis that these firms are disadvantaged in two fundamental ways in 
Mauritania: first of all, they are squeezed by the presence of powerful business 
groups/large firms which have de facto monopolies in important sectors of the 
economy. Secondly, they are the most likely firms to pay bribes and pay the highest 
amounts in percentage of their total annual sales, which places an additional burden 
on their ability to grow.    21
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Annex 1: Key governance indicators 
 
 Indicators  Definition/Explanation  Latest Year 




Six composite governance indicators:  
1. Voice and accountability 
2. Political stability and absence of violence 
3. Government effectiveness 
4. Regulatory quality 
5. Rule of law 














Composite index that relates to perceptions of the 
degree of corruption as seen by business people and 
country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) 
and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
2006 84





































Evaluates country’s policies and institutions by 
analyzing 16 dimensions. Governance-related 
dimensions are: Property rights and rules-based 
governance; Quality of budgetary management; Quality 
of public administration; Transparency, accountability & 
corruption in the public sector 
(Also serves as one of the sources for the KKM and 
CPI) 
2005 
On a scale from 1 (worst) to 6 
(best), Mauritania scored: 
3.0 for property rights and rules-
based governance; 
2.0 for quality of budgetary 
management; 
3.0 for quality of public 
administration; 
2.5 for transparency, 





Evaluates ease of doing business by monitoring ten 
categories: 
1. Starting a business; 2. Dealing with licenses; 3. 
Employing workers; 4. Registering property 5. Getting 
credit; 6. Protecting investors; 7.Paying taxes; 8. 
Trading across borders; 9. Enforcing contracts; 10. 
Closing a business. 
2006 
Overall rank: 148 out of 175 
In top half for Registering 
property and Enforcing 
contracts 
Among lowest performers in 




































Survey of private sector firms and employees to 
evaluate the overall business environment.  2006 
29.1% of firms say corruption is 
major or severe constraint 
6.6% of yearly turnover spent on 
informal payments 
Polity IV Country 
Report 
Records annual information on political regime and 
authority characteristics. Includes indicator on 
executive constraints, defined as the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making 
powers of chief executives. 
2004 
On a scale from 1 (worst) to 7 
(best): 
Executive constraints: 3.0 






























Borders  Press freedom index  2006  77





Principle diagnostic tool in public financial management 
designed to help the borrowing country and the Bank 
assess financial accountability arrangements in the 
public and private sectors.  
2002 
External controls of public 
spending virtually non-existent. 
Audit court does not check 
public accounts, and capacity of 




































Main instrument of the World Bank for analyzing the 
member countries’ present procurement policies, 
organization, and procedures. 
2002 
Lack of uniformity and 
confidentiality in the evaluation 
process opens up opportunities 
for corruption. 
   25
Annex 2: Variables used on research with quantitative data on corruption 
 
 
Study Source  of 
information 
Sample  Dependent corruption variables  
(Model in brackets):  







(a) Likelihood of a firm paying bribes (probit), 
determined by: 
The provision of infrastructure services; 
International trade; 
Tax rate, formal sector; 
Number of competitors for the firm’s main 
product; 
Exemptions from corporate tax and import duties. 
 
(b) Bribe payment in US$ per employee (OLS), 
determined by: 
Profits per employee; 
Capital stock per employee; 
Alternative return per employee. 
Kuncoro (2006)  2001 and 2003 










(a) Bribe payment in day-to-day operations as a 
share of production costs (OLS), determined by: 
Tax rate; 
Time spent with bureaucrats; 
Bribe uncertainty (i.e., other parties asking bribes); 
Firm size in terms of annual sales.  
 
(b) Bribe payment to set up a new business as a 
share of production costs (OLS), determined by: 
Time spent with bureaucrats; 
Number of licenses; 
Bribe uncertainty; 
FDI. 
Source: Svensson (2003) and Kuncoro (2006). 
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Annex 3: List of variables for model used 
 
Variable name  Definition  Expected 
sign 
Dependent    
 Bribery  Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm reports to 
have paid bribes in 2005 and 0 otherwise 
 
 Bribes over sales  Bribes as a share of firm’s total sales in 2005 (percentage)   
Independent    
 Age  Age of the firm  - 
  Audit  Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm had its 
statements and certificates audited by an external party in 
2005 and zero otherwise 
+ 
 Foreign  Binary variable taking the value 1 if at least 3 percent of the 
firm’s capital is foreign-owned and zero otherwise 
+ 
 Economic group  Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm belongs to an 
economic group and zero otherwise 
+ 
 Employment  Total employment at the end of 2005  +/- 
 Employment squared  Total employment at the end of 2005 squared  - 
 Micro  Dummy for employees [1, 6[   
 Small  Dummy for employees [6, 11[   
 Medium  Dummy for employees [11, 21[   
 Large  Dummy for employees [21, 276]   
 Investments over sales  Investments in machinery, equipment, and real estate as a 
share of total sales in 2005 (percentage) 
+ 
 Loan  Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm had a loan in 
2005 and zero otherwise 
+ 
 Monthly wage per worker
1  Monthly wage received per worker in 2005 (LCU)  - 
 Tax time  Percentage of senior’s management time spent dealing with 
government regulations each week  
- 
  Corruption  Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm rate 
corruption as a major or severe obstacle to its growth and 
operations, and zero otherwise  
+ 
 Fiscal inspections  Number of fiscal inspections in 2005  + 
 Infrastructure index  Index (0-2) of unavailability of public services. The index is 
the sum of two dummy variables indicating if electricity and 
telephone are unavailable (service dummy = 1 if unavailable, 
and zero otherwise) 
+ 
Notes: A variable for international trade was initially considered, but only 4 percent and 10 percent of firms 
in the sample export and import, respectively. A dummy variable for informal sector was not included in 
the regressions because informality is captured by firm size (all micro firms are informal and vice-versa). 
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Annex 4: Summary statistics, all firms 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
  Age  361  9.42 7.52 1.00  48.00 
  Audit  361  0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
 Foreign  361      0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00 
 Employment  361      11.97  24.56  1.00  276.00 
 Employment squared  361     744.64  5,142.10  1.00  76,176.00 
 Micro  361       0.44  0.50  0.00  1.00 
 Small  361       0.31  0.46  0.00  1.00 
 Medium  361       0.14  0.34  0.00  1.00 
 Large  361       0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00 
 Investments over sales  350     109.86  1,197.95  0.00  20,833.33 
 Loan  360       0.12  0.33  0.00  1.00 
 Monthly wage per worker
  361 36,219.98  21,839.37  6,250.00  166,666.70 
 Tax time  360       6.10  12.70  0.00  100.00 
 Corruption  360       0.16  0.37  0.00  1.00 
 Fiscal inspections  361       0.89  0.31  0.00  1.00 
 Infrastructure index  361       0.48  0.73  0.00  2.00 
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Annex 5: Breakdown by size, region, sector, legal status, ownership, exporting status, external auditing, and competition 
 
Category  Informal payments requested to obtain government services (% of firms)  Inspections 














Average #   Bribe requested (% 
firms) 
All  firms  34.7 35.6 56.5  46.9 28.6  30.0 89.5  2.4  44.0 
  Formal  38.5  42.0  75.0  52.6  30.4  33.3  89.9  2.3  50.2 
  Informal  21.7  21.7  36.4  27.3  20.0  0.0  88.7  2.8  31.8 
Size              
  Micro  28.2  27.8  36.4  26.7  42.9  20.0  88.6  2.7  34.3 
  Small  30.3  31.8  75.5  45.4  25.0  27.3  93.8  2.2  51.9 
  Medium   63.6  71.4  50.0  75.0  33.3  50.0  89.8  2.4  61.4 
  Large  38.9  50.0  100.0  75.0  20.0  50.0  80.5  2.2  36.4 
Region              
  Nouakchott  10.0 6.2 66.7  40.0  40.0  0.0 88.8 2.3  47.1 
  Nouadibou  37.4 43.9 55.0  48.7 26.1  31.6 93.8  3.5  24.4 
Formal sector              
  Manufacturing  40.0 58.8 75.0  70.0 11.1  25.0 87.5  2.4  55.7 
 Retail and IT  33.3  25.0  37.5  26.3  44.4  14.3  95.2  2.0  53.3 
 Other services (RofU)  24.5  18.1  n.o.  16.0  7.5  6.4  88.3  2.4  43.4 
Legal status              
  Publicly listed 
company  42.9 54.6 77.8  70.0 23.5  66.7 85.9  2.8  50.8 
  Partnership  25.0  20.0  33.3  50.0  50.0  0.0  92.7  2.5  57.9 
  Family business  31.0  28.3  45.4  37.9  28.6  26.7  90.0  2.3  39.7 
Ownership              
  Domestic  29.4  30.5  57.9  43.2  31.8  18.7  89.9  2.4  42.5 
  Some foreign  62.5  57.1  50.0  58.3  16.7  75.0  85.7  2.7  56.7 
Exports in 2005              
  Exporter  80.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  86.7  3.7  46.2 
  Non-exporter  32.3  31.9  54.5  45.8  29.6  31.6  89.6  2.4  43.9 
External auditing              
  Yes  43.5  53.8  50.0  50.0  10.0  75.0  88.4  2.0  44.7 
  No  32.0  31.7  58.8  46.5  38.9  18.7  89.6  2.5  43.9 
Competition              
  Domestic  33.3  60.0  80.0  33.3  0.0  0.0  90.7  2.1  59.0 
  Foreign  44.4  66.7  66.7  75.0  0.0  0.0  83.3  2.0  66.7 
Source: Mauritania ICS, 2006.  29
Annex 6: Breakdown by size, region, sector, legal status, ownership, exporting status, external auditing, and competition 
 
Category  Obs.  Share of firms reporting 
corruption as a major or 
severe obstacle to growth 
(%) 
Share of firms that believe 
firms in their business were 
requested to make informal 
payments to “advance 
things” 
(%) 
Share of firms believe firms 
in their business were made 
informal payments to 
“advance things” 
(%) 
Informal payments to 
"advance things:" average 
share of total sales  
(%) 
All firms  361  16.1  48.5  49.4  3.2 
   Formal  237  18.2  59.5  46.8  3.4 
   Informal  124  12.1  54.0  54.2  2.7 
Size       
   Micro  158  13.3  55.4  51.0  2.8 
   Small  113  11.5  58.0  40.2  2.8 
   Medium     49  20.8  55.3  62.2  4.5 
   Large    41  34.1  66.7  54.3  4.4 
Region      
  Nouakchott  313  16.0  54.6  45.0  3.1 
  Nouadibou    48  17.0  76.6  76.6  4.2 
Formal sector         
  Manufacturing    80  29.1  60.3  49.3  4.0 
  Retail and IT    63  11.1  61.9  33.3  2.9 
  Other services 
(RofU)    94 
13.8 
57.1 53.4  3.1 
Legal status         
   Publicly listed 
company 
  71  34.3 
63.8 53.2  5.0 
   Partnership    41  17.1  56.1  55.0  3.1 
   Family business  249  10.8  55.9  47.4  2.8 
Ownership       
   Domestic  325  16.1  56.4  48.0  3.1 
   Some foreign    35  17.1  68.6  61.3  4.3 
Exports in 2005        
   Exporter    15  26.7  66.7  57.1  4.8 
   Non-exporter  346  15.7  57.1  49.1  3.2 
External auditing        
   Yes    43  32.6  60.5  35.0  5.5 
   No  318  13.9  45.8  51.4  2.9 
Competition        
   Domestic    43  31.0  53.4  59.5  3.2 
   Foreign    18  44.5  61.1  25.0  5.5   30
Annex 7: Independent variables used in the probit and OLS regressions 
 
 
 Age  Audit 
Econ 















insp  IF index 
Age  1.000                        
Audit  0.110  1.000                      
Econ  group 0.199  0.355  1.000                    
E-mail  0.097  0.407  0.372  1.000                  
Foreign  0.133  0.254  0.108  0.137  1.000                 
Invest/worker 0.031  0.065  0.161  0.026 0.075 1.000                 
Invest/sales -0.079  -0.031  0.138  -0.052  -0.018 0.844 1.000               
Loan 0.095  0.210  0.242  0.148  0.073  0.000 -0.005  1.000             
Monthly 
wage/worker  0.159 0.321 0.202 0.303  0.164  0.056  -0.090 0.189  1.000           
Tax sales  -0.037  0.284  0.255  0.263  0.143 0.081 0.005  0.084  0.208  1.000         
Tax time  0.101  0.160  0.199  0.271  0.181  0.056  0.021  0.153  0.101 0.098 1.000       
Corruption 0.158  0.138  0.141  0.105  0.013  0.107  0.100  0.189  0.090 0.088 0.103  1.000     
Fiscal insp  -0.062  -0.028  -0.111  -0.067  -0.041  0.013 -0.034  -0.015  -0.034  0.110 -0.048  -0.067  1.000   
IF index  -0.109  0.177  0.058  0.226  0.144  0.142  0.085 0.049  0.046 -0.020  0.117 0.194  -0.038  1.000 
Emp 0.221  0.437  0.395  0.330  0.298 0.108 0.009  0.322  0.363  0.179 0.130  0.061 -0.051  0.053 
Emp sq  0.123  0.325  0.269  0.126  0.215  0.040  -0.007 0.271  0.260  0.046  0.018 0.018  0.004  0.018 
Small -0.043  -0.070  -0.084  -0.038  -0.065  -0.040  -0.061 -0.130  0.108  0.038  -0.059 -0.087  0.100  0.005 
Medium  0.068  0.036  0.086  0.265  0.063 -0.040 -0.037  0.071  0.114 0.104 0.094 0.032  -0.005  -0.064 
Large  0.263  0.382  0.454  0.396 0.159 0.222 0.128  0.244  0.239 0.240 0.251  0.169 -0.124  0.070 
Retail and IT  -0.199  -0.254  -0.288  -0.309  -0.122  -0.072 0.001  -0.093 -0.272  -0.274 -0.097  -0.088  0.081  0.024 
Other services  -0.013  0.047  0.023  0.116  0.011 -0.054 -0.065  -0.131  0.071  0.133 -0.091  -0.041  -0.051  -0.024 
Nouadhibou -0.066  -0.066  -0.079  0.041  0.133  -0.048  -0.035 0.131  -0.076 -0.026 0.294  -0.008  0.047  0.031 
SA 0.262  0.470  0.449  0.529  0.233  0.049  -0.042  0.300  0.324 0.341 0.270  0.256 -0.084  0.219 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on data from the Mauritania ICS, 2006. 
 